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PROSPECTS FOR INDIAN AND PAKISTANI ARMS
CONTROL AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES
Feroz Hassan Khan
The regional dynamic in South Asia is both extravagant and complicated. Forcenturies various empires have risen, thrived, and fallen, as numerous wars
and clashes for control over resources spread across the geography. South Asian
history writ large has seen hypothetical borders redrawn several times, leaving
in question the viability of state control and perpetuating ethnic tensions.
Though the great partition of India in 1947 ought to have politically resolved
communal disharmony, the haste of British withdrawal created a geopolitical
quagmire that has resulted in an “enduring rivalry” between the nations of India
and Pakistan, one that has lasted for more than sixty years.1
The contemporary security climate in the region has exacerbated this histori-
cal precedent of protracted conflict, which has in turn nurtured an environment
that remains resistant to the building of trust and con-
fidence. Since their demonstrations of nuclear capa-
bilities, both India and Pakistan have increased the
risk of war, with cross-border arms buildups and fail-
ure to sustain a peace dialogue. Moreover, the regional
security environment breeds broader strategic anxi-
eties in both India and Pakistan, which makes the like-
lihood of conventional war between the two nuclear-
armed neighbors higher than it is anywhere else in the
world.
Thus the ensuing regional culture leans more to-
ward military competition than to strategic restraint
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and conflict resolution (the logical course for strategic stability). Clearly, to con-
sider the prospects of arms control and confidence-building measures (CBMs)
in the midst of this climate is problematic in itself, but the various grievances be-
come even more convoluted when strategic imbalances are further influenced
by the singular perceptions of the predominating powers in the region.
In the face of these geopolitical calamities, this article examines the realistic
prospects of sustainable arms control and CBMs in South Asia over the next de-
cade. The first section examines the strategic anxieties of India and Pakistan, re-
spectively; the second section reviews the treaties and CBMs that have been
attempted in the past (some of them still applicable today), drawing out a trend
of crisis and bilateral missteps. Later sections analyze the Strategic Restraint Re-
gime (SRR) proposed in 1998, as well as the Lahore Memorandum of Under-
standing (MOU) of 1999, and how such measures can be more effective in the
future. Finally, the article presents three possible trajectories that the region
might take and suggests new ways forward that could create an environment
amenable to pragmatic CBMs and limited arms-control measures.
STRATEGIC ANXIETIES
As previously suggested, the dynamics associated with the endemic rivalry be-
tween India and Pakistan must be viewed through the broader lens of regional
politics and security. This becomes more apparent when considering India’s
perception of Chinese strategic objectives in South Asia. If any realistic CBMs
are to be proposed for the future, such perceptions must be factored into the
overall security equation.
India’s Strategic Anxieties
In general, India believes that China is encircling the country, by establishing
special partnerships with many of India’s smaller neighbors. Specifically, India is
irked by the evolving relationship between China and Pakistan, a relationship
that India believes has the singular purpose of thwarting its own natural rise as
an aspiring global power.
One of the more onerous issues is a perception that has come to be known as
the “string of pearls.”2 To provide a frame of reference, Pakistan’s Makran Coast
has strategic importance, in that it offers Pakistan options to counter India’s
projection of power in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan has already shown signs that
it is moving to develop broader air and naval capabilities. The buildup of the
Gwadar commercial port along this coast—assisted by China—exacerbates In-
dia’s anxieties and provides Pakistan with broader strategic utility. For the Chi-
nese, it provides a potential access to energy pipelines that would “unlock trade
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routes to the market and energy supplies of Central Asia,” with less risk than at
present.3
This is important because India is geographically restricted in its access to
both the east and west, due to the physical presence of Bangladesh and Pakistan,
and in the north by the Himalayas. In this regard, India’s access to Southwest
Asia runs into a geopolitical barrier, because of its rivalry with Pakistan. Simi-
larly, India suffers constraints with respect to East Asia imposed by Bangladesh
and Burma, which physically block India’s access to those markets. With China
entering the scene with a growing presence along the Makran Coast, the situa-
tion from India’s perspective becomes even more tenuous. This strategic handi-
cap, taken as a whole, forces India to rely on its maritime capabilities in order to
maintain trade routes and logistics between its continental shores and the rest of
the world.
As a part of this expanded naval presence, India has launched ballistic-missile
submarines and produced other naval capabilities that can act as an extended
security arm for its various trade routes, as well as a third strike capability (that
is, in addition to its land-based and air assets). India’s growing presence in the
maritime environment, in conjunction with its overall strategic rise, makes its
smaller neighbors nervous. This strategic apprehension creates a ripple effect
across the region whereby the smaller countries move closer to external alli-
ances in order to balance India’s rising power.
Additionally, India believes, China is propping up Pakistan’s nuclear and mil-
itary capabilities in areas where Western technologies are not meeting the need.
In particular, India is under the impression that Pakistan is taking advantage of
America’s involvement in Afghanistan, which places it in a unique position to
acquire strategic capabilities and political remuneration.
Whatever its concerns, however, India’s strategic calculus of structural and
conventional force advantages over Pakistan was neutralized (to an extent)
when Pakistan demonstrated its nuclear capability in 1998. Many Indian strate-
gists believe that this nuclear hedge enables Pakistan to conduct asymmetric
warfare against India, without fear of reprisal. This perception reinforces India’s
belief that as long as Pakistan can keep India engaged inwardly through insur-
gencies and build its own strategic alliances with the United States and China,
India’s rise to power will be curtailed.
Pakistan’s Strategic Anxieties
Generally speaking, Pakistan’s strategic anxieties in the region are a mirror re-
flection of those of India, vis-à-vis the other half of the “enduring rivalry.” For
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Pakistan, however, the objective is threefold but simple: national survival, rele-
vance as an actor in the region, and refusal to be marginalized by India.
Pakistan wields vast manpower, with a population of 170 million; possesses
strong strategic assets, in the shape of nuclear weapons and natural resources;
fields a conventional army of a half-million; and is a proactive player in the Mus-
lim world. The latter point not only connects Pakistan with the Muslim commu-
nity in a bilateral sense but also helps in bridging the gaps between Islamic
countries and China and with the United States. Despite the credit it has re-
ceived for such macro-level factors, its intense rivalry and competition with In-
dia over the past sixty years have made Pakistan India-phobic and paranoid
about a variety of issues.
Much as India worries over the geographic firewall that restricts its land ac-
cessibility to the east and west, so does Pakistan interpret Indian foreign-policy
maneuvers as aimed at geopolitically encircling Pakistan itself. As India
increases its influence and presence in Afghanistan with a slew of consulates,
Pakistan considers these developments hostile to its interests. India has also
established a strategically located air base in Tajikistan (Ayni Air Base in
Dushanbe), which also adds to these suspicions. Further, India’s investment in
the Iranian port of Chabahar—fifty miles west of Gwadar Port—and construc-
tion of roads through Zahedan into Afghanistan add additional tension in an
area that is essential for the transportation of goods and energy to a host of
countries. All these moves are seen as encircling Pakistan.
There are also operational issues that hinder Pakistan’s strategic balance on
its eastern and western borders. India’s strategic orientation remains toward Pa-
kistan, where the bulk of its armed forces are deployed. As a result, Indian and
Pakistani troops remain deployed—“eyeball to eyeball”—along the Line of
Control (LoC) in Kashmir; this has been the case since 1948. On its opposite
border along the frontier territory with Afghanistan, Pakistan’s anxieties are
manifest in the complex internal strife and multiple insurgencies and instabili-
ties. In sum, Pakistan must balance dealing with India, multiple insurgencies,
and retaining interests in Afghanistan.
The ultimate nightmare for Pakistan would be to live between two hostile
neighbors, India in the east and Afghanistan in the west. Pakistan believes that
unless issues are resolved with India, it will have no choice but to seek arrange-
ments with an ethnically diverse and friendly government in Kabul—a govern-
ment that would not do the bidding of powers hostile to Pakistan or further
destabilize already troubled border areas. On the contrary, if Afghanistan be-
comes a strategic instrument of Indian geopolitical outmaneuvering, that,
added to the ongoing problems in Jammu and Kashmir, would produce a per-
petual state of tension and crises among the three countries.
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Overarching these regional issues is Pakistan’s fear that its long-term ally the
United States may eventually turn against it, under Indian influence. The
U.S.-Indian nuclear deal reached in 2005 exacerbated these anxieties, viewed as
it is by Pakistan as skewing the balance even more greatly in favor of the already
powerful India.4 In fact, since 9/11, there has been a slow erosion of overall inter-
national sympathy with Pakistan’s grievances, especially with regard to Jammu
and Kashmir, the socioeconomic costs of three decades of Afghan wars, and
daily episodes of terrorism within Pakistan.
The prospects of such growing political and economic disparities with re-
spect to India, coupled with these mounting internal problems (especially per-
sistent terrorism, ranging from Quetta to Swat), will continue to endanger
Pakistan’s aggregate national power. Consistent pressure from India, instability
in Afghanistan, and a fragile domestic structure are likely to render Pakistan as a
state significantly weak and unstable. Its aforementioned strengths could very
well become vulnerabilities, stirring broad, international upheaval. These cir-
cumstances make Pakistanis all the keener to obtain a strategic peace with India,
one that allows them the space and time to recover from these challenges.
BREAKING THE GRIDLOCK
Given these strategic anxieties, it is no wonder that both India and Pakistan suc-
cumb to gridlock rather than seeking a path of reconciliation and confidence
building. Further, because of blatantly conflicting objectives between the two
countries—one global, the other regional—security competition and asymme-
try of interests continue to grow between the two. Despite negativity and pessi-
mism, however, there is in fact potential for both new confidence building and
arms-control measures. A brief overview of CBMs from 1947 to date will illus-
trate the nature of the problem; a conceptual consideration of past initiatives is
especially necessary in that they have been directly connected to crisis and mired
in ulterior motives. The lessons of these unsuccessful attempts can strengthen
efforts to frame such policies in the future.
Major Agreements and Treaties, 1947–2004
Every major treaty or CBM between these countries has its origin in crisis reso-
lution. Historically, Pakistan preferred outside mediation in disputes with India;
as a smaller and weaker party with a strong sense that morality was on its side, it
was convinced that it could win justice through international organizations like
the United Nations or alliances with major powers. That proved to be a fallacy.
Instead, during the Cold War Pakistan became a geopolitical pawn between the
superpowers. Rather than strengthening itself by alliance and international as-
sertions of its relevancy as against its archrival India, it found itself in strategic
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competition with India in frameworks where trajectories favored India and alli-
ances did not mitigate its own security concerns. This became a fundamental
reason for Pakistan to seek a nuclear weapons program.
India, for its part, has always despised outside intervention in its subconti-
nental affairs and sought to address all problems on a bilateral basis—because of
an asymmetry of power tipped in its favor. In general, bilateralism has suited In-
dia for strategic reasons and conforms to its traditional nonaligned stance of
keeping the superpowers away from the region. Nevertheless, despite this insis-
tence, not a single problem has been resolved on a bilateral basis. Moreover, since
9/11 Pakistan has come under scrutiny from the international community in re-
gard to its use of asymmetric force to settle the dispute over Jammu and Kash-
mir. In that context, outside intervention does not necessarily favor Pakistan but
could strengthen India’s position. That aside, however, treaties and agreements
brokered by outside intervention have had a generally good record of imple-
mentation on the parts of both India and Pakistan.
The first agreement after the 1947–48 war over Kashmir, through bilateral
talks between India and Pakistan, came about as an extension of a UN Security
Council resolution. Under the 1948 resolution the 1949 Karachi Agreement was
constituted. This initial agreement should have served as a framework for other
measures since then.5 To date, the Karachi Agreement has been the guideline for
the conduct of troops deployed along the LoC in Kashmir, monitored by UN ob-
servers. Both India and Pakistan have deployed forces along the LoC adhering
(by and large) to the parameters set by the UN-approved agreement.
The next major agreement, the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, was also a response
to crisis and was brokered by a third party, in this case the World Bank. This
agreement, over water distribution, had its origin in the Kashmir crisis. While an
“out of the box” interim solution from former president Pervez Musharraf to the
Kashmir dispute went nowhere, negotiations continued to drag on behind the
scenes. At the same time, India began constructing new dams in Kashmir, divert-
ing water resources authorized for Pakistan; this was in clear violation of the
Indus Waters Treaty. (Kashmir is not just an ideological and territorial dispute
but a water-resource issue as well.) Though both India and Pakistan have devel-
oped reasonable complaints about it, the basic tenets of the treaty have func-
tioned despite many wars and military crises. Yet if India’s strategy to use dam
construction and water diversion as leverage against Pakistan persists, it could
well lead to the eventual collapse of the Indus Waters Treaty altogether.
The Tashkent Agreement of 1966 was brokered by the Soviets after the 1965
war between India and Pakistan, with the indirect support of the United States.
Once again, it came about as a result of crisis and war. Though the Tashkent
Agreement provided no framework for resolution of the disputes between India
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and Pakistan—at least for the following twenty-five years—it put the dispute
over Jammu and Kashmir on the back burner.
After the ensuing Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, however, the approach to dia-
logue changed. With India’s primacy established, no further agreement was im-
plemented on a third-party basis. Subsequent agreements would be conducted
bilaterally, or with mere pressure from, rather than direct involvement of, the in-
ternational community. Three major agreements can be attributed to Indian
and Pakistani bilateral relations. Again, each of these agreements had crisis as a
backdrop:
• The Simla Agreement of 1972, directly in response to the 1971 war
• The Lahore Agreement of 1999, in reaction to the crisis spawned from the
1998 nuclear tests and the ongoing Kashmir crisis
• The 2004 Islamabad Accord, resulting from 9/11 and the 2001–2002 mili-
tary crisis and Kashmir issues.
All the bilateral agreements had an effective framework to resolve conflict but
no effective longevity. One after another they were violated by one side or the
other, each time resulting in deep military crises. For example, in the mid-1980s,
India was undergoing a Sikh crisis in Punjab when the Indian Army assaulted
the Sikh holy shrine in Amritsar (Operation BLUESTAR), exacerbating the Sikh
insurgency. Simultaneously, in a planned military operation, India decided to
occupy the Siachin Glacier (Operation MEGHDOOT) in the disputed northern
area of Kashmir. This event once again brought Jammu and Kashmir to the fore-
front of the India-Pakistan dispute. Two years later, the Indian Army chief, Gen-
eral Krishnaswamy Sundarji, planned a major military exercise code-named
BRASSTACKS, incorporating a secret plan for a preventive war to neutralize Paki-
stan’s nuclear program.6 These two crises occurred at a time when Pakistan was
deeply involved in an asymmetric war (with the support of the United States)
against the Soviet Union.
The next crisis, in 1990, resulted from a Kashmir uprising that escalated to
such a point that India and Pakistan were once again at the brink of war. This cri-
sis was particularly significant in that both India and Pakistan had covert nu-
clear weapons capabilities, which was known to both sides. This factor
prompted the United States to intervene in such crises from then onward.
The history of trust-damaging episodes in the midst of such crisis has had far
more weight than has the record of keeping faith in treaties. Again, while India
has been able to project its position to a global audience, Pakistan has typically
had a smaller, regional venue. All of these elements help explain the rise and fail-
ure of various agreements, treaties, and accords. Yet another lens with regard to
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progress on the diplomatic front is the introduction of strategic confidence-
building measures.
Strategic CBMs
The notion of “strategic CBMs” implies that nuclear and conventional-force
CBMs are in a symbiotic relationship. One of the foremost issues regarding
CBMs between India and Pakistan is of a conceptual nature. The premise behind
strategic CBMs is that nuclear measures on their own are meaningless if conven-
tional force restraints are not applied. There are four distinct areas where India
and Pakistan differ in terms of structuring and harnessing CBMs, where arms
control becomes problematic.
First, India finds abhorrent anything that binds it to regional limits. From the
outset India has taken global disarmament as the necessary context to project its
own position on disarmament with regard to nuclear weapons. Pakistan, in con-
trast, insists that everything is regional and India-specific. India does not want
to be tied down to Pakistan alone but recognizes problems with other countries
(specifically China) that must also be considered; it wants only nuclear military
CBMs, to keep its conventional-force supremacy intact. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s
insistence on regional nuclear CBMs is a result of Western pressure to forgo its
nuclear ambitions; its nuclear program was nurtured under obstacles, sanctions,
and other reprisals imposed by the nonproliferation regime. Moreover, these
sanctions have affected Pakistan negatively, whereas India has sustained them
with little or no effect.
Second, India considers any CBM that inhibits its use of force within the re-
gion as contradicting its force posture; this is Pakistan’s fundamental problem.
Third, India insists that nuclear CBMs begin with a declared doctrine; Pakistan
simply believes that real doctrines are classified, that declared doctrines are sim-
ply “verbal posturing” meant for diplomatic consumption only.7
Last, India believes that its declared second-strike doctrine and civilian su-
premacy over the armed forces sufficiently explain its articulation of command
and control over nuclear weapons. For Pakistan, clear delineation of command
channels and explicit assignment of decision-making bodies are necessary for a
system responsible for managing nuclear weapons in peace, crisis, and war. This
emphasis on command and control reflects Pakistan’s own checkered history of
civil-military relations.
With all this as background, Pakistan began to make regional proposals be-
ginning with India’s first nuclear test, in 1974. It made seven regionally based
proposals, each automatically rejected by India.8 This allowed Pakistan to
show—that is, to show the region—that India did not want to cooperate, thus
placing the burden of defending its position on India. Pakistan knew that the
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proposals were not realistic, and the international community did as well
(though not all were disingenuous, and there might have been a different out-
come had world powers not dismissed them). Pakistan also used these regional
proposals to create the diplomatic space for the development of its own nuclear
program, while simultaneously shifting the responsibility for proliferation to
the bigger power.
New military and nuclear CBMs, similar to the treaties previously discussed,
came in the wake of nuclear developments and military crises. Most of them
were, once again, bilateral. For example, the prohibition in 1988 against attack-
ing nuclear installations and facilities was a response to information, which was
widely analyzed, showing that India would attack Pakistani nuclear installa-
tions; precedent was also established by Siachin and the bombing of Iraqi nu-
clear facilities.
India and Pakistan once again adopted bilateral agreements following the
major crisis in the 1980s, when political leadership under Zia-ul-Haq and subse-
quent civilian leaders, like Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, created initiatives
with India’s Rajiv Gandhi and other congressional leaders. Additional agree-
ments would follow.
Notification of military exercises and airspace violations actually arose from
BRASSTACKS and other, minor incidents in which the Indian Army contemplated
making war on Pakistan. The agreement would oblige each side to provide ad-
vance notification of military exercises.
Another example is the bilateral, joint declaration in 1992 of the complete
prohibition of chemical weapons, a result of allegations by both sides that the
other was building a chemical weapons program. This joint agreement was also
a way to deflect pressure from the international community, which was then ne-
gotiating the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which was eventually
signed in 1993. When India declared possession of chemical weapons as re-
quired by the CWC, however, Pakistan protested, alleging violation of the bilat-
eral, joint declaration against chemical weapons.
Last is the hotlines agreement between the directors-general of military oper-
ations (DGMOs), foreign secretaries, and maritime security agencies. It came
about as an agreed mechanism by which military and diplomats could commu-
nicate in order to prevent emergence of a crisis and manage escalation. Though
this is a reasonable purpose and a practical means of communication, it has not
been used in such a manner; instead, the hotlines have typically been used for
deception, at worst, and postcrisis management, at best. There are plenty of ex-
amples of such misuse of this otherwise productive tool: hotlines were useful af-
ter the Kargil crisis, but not during it;9 hotlines between the DGMOs did not
work when the 1999 Indian plane hijacking crisis was at its peak; the foreign
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secretaries line did not prevent the Mumbai 2008 attack from derailing the en-
tire peace process; and the maritime security hotline has not prevented the daily
seizure of fishermen by each side but has been used only after the fact when the
governments decide to return them.
All of these agreements reflect thoughtful ideas but incredibly poor imple-
mentation. Neither side has built upon such measures; instead, each has used
them as means to counteract the other.
The Lahore MOU and the Strategic Restraint Regime
The Lahore MOU is, in contrast, by far the most significant agreement between
India and Pakistan, one that has not just created a framework for new arms con-
trol and CBMs but offers the prospect of conflict resolution as well.
The Lahore MOU came about at the famous summit between the prime min-
isters of India and Pakistan in February 1999. The agreement was a result of an
intense eight-month process, beginning after the nuclear test in May 1998, in
which American diplomats led by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot were
actively involved. UN Security Council Resolution 1172, of June 1998, con-
demned both India and Pakistan, placing stringent conditions on both coun-
tries and addressing the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.
In fact, many ideas flowed between Indian and Pakistani diplomats during
this period.10 India and Pakistan decided to “triangulate” their bilateral dia-
logues, making the United States a third party. Theoretically, this was a good way
forward, with each side speaking separately to the United States; however, suspi-
cion ensued. Another entanglement was that the United States approached the
issue based on its experience in Europe; that did not necessarily conform to the
strategic realities of South Asia. For example, most CBMs and agreements of the
Cold War had been fashioned for a bipolar world, but the Lahore agreements
happened after the East-West conflict had ended.
Despite these incongruities, “strategic restraint” became the term du jour.
The American expert team presented Pakistan a paper called “Minimum Deter-
rence Posture,” offering such recommendations as geographical separation of
major components of nuclear arsenals and their delivery means; segregation of
delivery systems from warhead locations; declaration of nonnuclear delivery
systems, with their specific locations (e.g., which squadrons of aircraft, at given
locations, would be nuclear or nonnuclear); establishment of finite ceilings for
fissile-material production and monitoring of nuclear testing; and last, limita-
tion of production and ballistic flight tests. All this was meant to produce what
was referred to as a “strategic pause.”
These proposals were alien to South Asian security experts. Again, they had
been derived from Cold War concepts that were not applicable to the regional
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security environment. India and Pakistan, obviously, did not accept them; how-
ever, the Pakistan side did recognize these concepts in principle, with a promise
to reconsider those proposals it presumed to be within its security interests. Sub-
sequently, Pakistan transformed these U.S. proposals into its own, regionally
based concept, the SRR.11 The SRR was conceptually based upon the principle of
nuclear restraint, with conventional force restraint as well—hence, it was a
strategic CBM. It was simply not practical for a small country like Pakistan to
“segregate” delivery systems, as suggested by the United States. That was unac-
ceptable, because it undercut the necessary ambiguity of Pakistan’s strategic de-
terrence, while allowing India to wage conventional war against it. Finally,
Pakistan and India were not subscribers to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), though they were in essential agreement with the United States
that they should not conduct more tests.
What Pakistan proposed was a comprehensive conventional-force restraint
agreement. This proposal had three major elements: identification of the offen-
sive forces of each country, with their locations and postures; designation of
geographical border areas as Low Force Zones (LFZs), from which offensive
forces would be kept away; and a long-term mutually balanced force reduction,
as conflict resolution and peace prevailed in the region. The Pakistani side pro-
duced several alternative proposals and designated each side’s offensive forces.
Identifying forces that are dangerous to each other would allow measures to sep-
arate them geographically in order to prevent tension and armed conflict.
The LFZs would be the hallmark of this intended policy. The border areas and
the towns close by would be defensive only, the sizes of forces in their garrisons
to be agreed upon by both sides. In the event of changes, each side would notify
the other. The proposed eventual force reduction would be “mutually balanced”
because India has a much larger military structure; conventional force reduc-
tions would be proportional, involving equal ratios.
On the question of “nonmating” nuclear weapons from their delivery sys-
tems, Pakistan acknowledged this to be an existential issue of nuclear posture.
Pakistan was amenable to formalizing regional nondeployment of nuclear
weapons in conjunction with conflict resolution and conventional force re-
straints. The SRR also proposed mutual missile restraints, including range and
payload ceilings, flight-testing notification, and prohibition of destabilizing
modernization, such as missile defense or submarine-launched ballistic
missiles.
However, the United States accepted India’s position in not agreeing to these
terms. This derailed the whole process. The dialogue lost its energy, as the United
States began to mirror India’s position, and Pakistan lost interest. Pakistan’s
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fundamental problem was India’s conventional threat, which remained unad-
dressed in every proposal by the United States. Any CBMs not related to conven-
tional force would be irrelevant. The failure of SSR to be accepted in South Asia
set the tone of U.S. policy toward the region, and a new strategic competition be-
tween India and Pakistan began. American ignorance of the SSR was a historic
failure; a general peace and stability framework could have been produced, as
against a trajectory of competition and conflict.
Nevertheless, the Lahore MOU framework had come about as a result of po-
litical will from the leadership in both India and Pakistan. The bureaucrats were
pressured to reach an agreement within a span of ten days—and they did. This
not only illustrates that there is no dearth of ideas as far as CBMs are concerned
but emphasizes the importance of political will. The Lahore MOU still stands as
the best way to pick up the threads of a peace and security architecture for South
Asia.
BAD, UGLY, AND GOOD: TRAJECTORIES IN THE REGION
India and Pakistan could take any of three possible trajectories in the second de-
cade of the twenty-first century, given their current courses. The stability of the
region would depend on the dynamics generated by the scenario that emerges—
ideally, one that promotes peace and security through strategic CBMs.
Bad. This scenario already exists: today the region as a whole stands in a “bad”
position. The choice is to go down either a path that leads to a good scenario or
one that plummets the situation into a multitude of ugly developments.
The status quo between India and Pakistan is fraught with tension, where
trust has been lost (as has been shown throughout this article). No third-party
influence can change this inertia. The only positive influence is the United
States; however, even under its nudging, India and Pakistan continue to only
“talk the talk,” not “walk the walk.” In each failed dialogue process the stronger
side learns the weaker side’s negotiating positions and finds vulnerabilities that
it can exploit when tension and crises return. Therefore, whenever Pakistan has
tried to concede points in the past, India, instead of converting the development
into a sincere, honest proposal, has come back with an alternative proposition
that it knows full well would be unacceptable for Pakistan.
The result is a gradual arms race that continues to push the region closer to
conventional force deployments. India continues to apply coercive diplomatic
pressure and suggestive doctrines like Cold Start, with threats implicit in public
statements by civilian and military leaders alike.12 In fact, Indian Army chief
Deepak Kapur recently stated publicly that India could deal with Pakistan
within the first ninety-six hours of engagement and then immediately turn to
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China.13 This is a merely one example of the aggressive posturing by the Indian
military in recent years. Because Pakistani forces are deployed on multiple
fronts, where potential political crises exist, the likelihood is that Pakistan will
push toward strategic weapons deployment or shift to an ambiguous nuclear de-
ployment—in two or three years, if trends persist.
Every major power is working with India on nuclear agreements, making
India the only country in the world that is a nonmember of the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but is at the same time recognized as a de facto nuclear-
weapons state. This appeasing of a state that has challenged the nonproliferation
regime and is not subject to the NPT is creating in Pakistan a sense of Western
duplicity and discrimination. These issues, coupled with the U.S. agenda to
jump-start the global arms-control process (CTBT, etc.), will force Pakistan into
a position where it no longer has any incentive to cooperate.
Ugly. If this bad trend continues, an even direr scenario will ensue. Increasing
tension between India and China, as well as India and Pakistan, will develop.
This will lead to a heightened security environment in the region, leading mili-
tary forces to be on the alert, if not fully deployed on the borders. Warfare could
easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Technological innovation would be focused on the acquisition or deploy-
ment of missile defenses, with the transfer of such technologies as the Israeli Ar-
row antiballistic missile. China may not deploy its strategic arsenal, but Pakistan
cannot be expected to remain nondeployed if it does. In response, India would
deploy a strategic arsenal made more robust by nuclear submarines, or a mix of
strategic weapons. If a situation of this sort happens, the possibility of hot pur-
suit across the LoC by Indian ground or special forces, cross-border attacks by
the Indian Air Force, or Indian naval coercive deployment in the Arabian Sea to
exploit Pakistan’s vulnerabilities cannot be ruled out.
Alternatively, the Cold Start deployment organization—involving “inte-
grated battle groups”—could be implemented. This would be a clear fortifica-
tion of the border and a flagrant attempt to escalate. In response, Pakistan would
break loose from all arms-control discussions. This could lead to a general melt-
down of the regional situation, with the United States no longer in a position to
intervene positively.
Good. The “ugly” scenario can be prevented if the current trajectories are re-
versed through cautious influence by the powers to end the India-Pakistan
deadlock. If the dialogue process does lead in a positive direction and in a mean-
ingful way, there can certainly be a “good” option, with a potential for strategic
CBMs.
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India must make a conscientious policy shift toward Pakistan, recognizing
the two positive trends that have recently emerged: first, the success of demo-
cratic political processes, and second, the focus of the Pakistani military on op-
posing violent extremism. India must reach out through the dialogue process to
strengthen and support these trends. India should also revise its current security
doctrine of coercion (Cold Start), exploitation (e.g., backing away from a per-
ceived negative role in Afghanistan), and aggressive diplomatic isolation of Pa-
kistan, which is in vogue at the time of this writing.
The best course for India is to pick up the threads of the Lahore MOU and
Islamabad Accord. If India takes up the Lahore framework and gives fair consid-
eration to the SSR (through the lens of strategic CBMs) that Pakistan offered,
progress can be made.
By way of easing the relationship and initiating people-to-people contact,
four separate endeavors should be agreed upon between India and Pakistan:
• Promote religious tourism. Sikhs, Hindus, Muslims, and members of other
religious sects should be afforded an opportunity to visit shrines in India,
as well as in Pakistan.
• Increase cultural tourism and sports exchanges. India has used sports as a
cultural and political tool in the past in ways ranging from threatening not
to send cricket teams for competition to openly supporting Hindu extrem-
ists threatening Pakistani players and cultural performances. Such acts
should cease and be replaced with more positive exchanges.
• Ease trade relations. There are concerns on both sides, but there can be
some linkages.
• Cooperate on the Indus Waters Treaty. For the first time, there is a sense
that India is using its position to bolster the water rights of Pakistan at its
own expense, by erecting dams, etc. If the Indians move in a direction that
embraces cooperation on such important strategic issues, the prospects of
CBMs can sow seed in this fertile soil.
A WAY FORWARD
In the next three to five years, there are four key areas in which prospects exist for
confidence-building measures, even rudimentary arms control—all of which
can be attributed to the tragic Mumbai incident in 2008. They are mentioned
here only briefly; further analysis and elaboration can be the subject of a later
discussion. Yet it is important to provide an overview of such potential measures
in proposing a new way forward.
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First and most immediate is a CBM by which India and Pakistan revive the
Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism that was agreed in 2006, as a follow-on to the
2004 Islamabad Accord. This mechanism failed as a result of the Mumbai inci-
dent. It is important that both countries draw lessons from the failure and im-
prove the mechanism so as to prevent the derailment of relations as a result of a
terror attack. It is unlikely that terrorism in the region will disappear anytime
soon, and it is important to not allow terrorists to hold two nuclear-armed states
hostage.
Next, India and Pakistan should establish a national risk reduction center.
Communications were deadlocked at both political and military levels after the
horrific Mumbai event. This indicated the fragility of relations between the two
countries. An institutional mechanism for communication about and resolu-
tion of such risks—over a spectrum from a Mumbai-type terror incident up to a
nuclear-related accident—is now essential.
The third CBM is maritime in nature. The Mumbai incident involved mari-
time transit, which is all the more reason for developing maritime CBMs be-
tween the two countries. India and Pakistan can, under the spirit of the Lahore
MOU, begin an incidents-at-sea agreement, delineate maritime boundaries to
prevent incursions by fishermen, and develop maritime cooperation in other ar-
eas, like piracy. The maritime hotline should be put to better use than it is at
present, as to prevent another Mumbai-related event or abduction of innocent
fishermen.
Finally, though it may appear premature, India and Pakistan must conduct a
sober analysis of their ballistic-missile inventories. As widely reported and un-
derstood, their shortest-range ballistic missiles—the Prithvi-I in the case of In-
dia, the HATF-I for Pakistan—have little strategic utility and pose technical
problems. It may be wise for India and Pakistan to eliminate these two capabili-
ties as a first step. This would be symbolic, not impacting military stature or ca-
pabilities for various contingencies. In the long term, however, there may be a
realization that the next category of ballistic missiles, Prithvi-II and HATF-II,
may also be of less military utility. (The technical and strategic aspects are left
for further analysis at a later time.)
Nonetheless, if the current deadlock over dialogue changes into a sustained
peace process, it puts the region on the “good” path. India and Pakistan can then
commence meaningful confidence-building measures, for which there are clauses
existing within the Lahore MOU that can be resurrected. Examples would be bi-
lateral consultations on security, disarmament, and nonproliferation issues; a re-
view of the existing communications links; and periodic assessments of the
implementation of existing CBMs. The Lahore MOU also promised that
F E R O Z H A S S A N K H A N 1 1 9
NWCR_Summer2010.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Summer2010\NWCR_Summer2010.vp
Tuesday, May 11, 2010 8:49:04 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
15
Khan: Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms Control and Confidence-Bu
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
agreements would be negotiated at a technical-expert level. In general, it would be
wise of India and Pakistan to begin a program of arms control and CBMs in the
next decade, under the rubric of the Lahore MOU.
The first decade of the twenty-first century has been plagued with tensions in
South Asia, from the war on terror in response to 9/11 to the lasting rivalry be-
tween India and Pakistan. This decade has shown that India and Pakistan remain
on the path of competition and nonresolution, a path steeped in historical pre-
cedent. The next decade should reverse this trend and shift from competition to
a cooperative security framework, one in which resolution of new security
threats and nontraditional security issues—water, energy, food security, and
cross-border terrorism—take precedence over old military disputes. India and
Pakistan share a history of competition and failure to follow through in the reso-
lution of disputes. Matters will worsen in the next decade—unless the countries
take advantage of positive elements that exist and adopt forward-looking,
cooperative-security outlooks.
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